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ABSTRACT
In The Philosophy of Information, Luciano Floridi presents a theory of “strongly seman-
tic information”, based on the idea that “information encapsulates truth” (the so-called
“veridicality thesis”). Starting with Popper, philosophers of science have developed differ-
ent explications of the notion of verisimilitude or truthlikeness, construed as a combination
of truth and information. Thus, the theory of strongly semantic information and the theory
of verisimilitude are intimately tied. Yet, with few exceptions, this link has virtually pass
unnoticed. In this paper, we briefly survey both theories and offer a critical comparison
of strongly semantic information and related notions, like truth, verisimilitude, and partial
truth.
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1. Introduction
In hisLogik der Forschung, Popper (1934) introduced to philosophy of science
the notion of the information content of a theory or hypothesis. The system-
atic study of this concept was then developed by Rudolf Carnap, Yehoshua
Bar-Hillel, Jaakko Hintikka, Isaac Levi, and others. Later, in an effort to
provide an epistemological basis to his falsificationist methodology, Popper
(1963) also introduced the concept of verisimilitude or truthlikeness of scien-
tific theories and hypotheses, construed as a combination of truth and infor-
mation. A statement is highly verisimilar when it is both highly informative
(it says many things about the target domain) and highly accurate (many of
those things are true, or approximately true). A number of scholars, among
which Pavel Tichý, Risto Hilpinen, Graham Oddie, Ilkka Niiniluoto, and
Theo A. F. Kuipers, developed different post-Popperian theories of verisimil-
itude, in order to avoid some logical problems encountered by Popper’s ex-
plication of this notion.
According to the classical theory of semantic information (Carnap and
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Bar-Hillel 1952), a logically false or contradictory statement is maximally
informative, a fact that Carnap and Bar-Hillel themselves acknowledged as
“counterintuitive”. Some scholars have found this consequence of the theory
plainly unacceptable: Floridi (2004), for instance, dubbed it “the Bar-Hillel-
Carnap semantic Paradox (BCP)”. Accordingly, Floridi (2004, 2011b) has
proposed a theory of “strongly semantic” information, based on the idea that
“information encapsulates truth”, i.e., that a statement has to be “truthful”
or “veridical” about a target domain in order to count as an item of informa-
tion at all.
Without entering in the debate about this “veridicality thesis”, in the
present paper we focus on the link between Floridi’s notion of strongly se-
mantic information and verisimilitude, which has virtually passed unnoticed
in the literature (a recent exception is D’Alfonso 2011; cf. also Frické 1997).
In particular, we try to disentangle the conceptual relations between the no-
tions of semantic information, truth, and verisimilitude, and we offer three
different precise explications of the intuition that “information encapsulates
truth”. To this purpose, we first introduce a simple logical framework to de-
fine and compare those notions (Section 1.1); then, we proceed as follows.
In Section 2, we present the classical theory of semantic information, and
in Section 3 the post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude. We then con-
sider Floridi’s theory of strongly semantic information (Section 4); this no-
tion is critically examined and compared with the related notions of truth,
verisimilitude and partial truth in Section 5. As a result, we obtain three dif-
ferent interpretations of the veridicality thesis, whose plausibility is briefly
discussed. Some general remarks (Section 6) conclude our discussion.
1.1. Preliminary notions
Since the theories of semantic information, of verisimilitude, and of strongly
semantic information are often phrased in quite different terms, it will be
useful to introduce a common logical framework that will be used to define
and compare those notions.
For the sake of simplicity, we will consider a finite propositional language
𝕃𝑛 with 𝑛 (logically independent) atomic sentences (or “atoms”) 𝑎1,… , 𝑎𝑛.
A literal or “basic sentence” (Carnap 1950, p. 67) of 𝕃𝑛 is either an atomic
sentence 𝑎𝑖 or its negation ¬𝑎𝑖; a literal will be denoted by “±𝑎𝑖”, where ± is
either empty or “¬”. Following established terminology (e.g., Hintikka 1973,
p. 152), a conjunction of 𝑛 literals, one for each atomic sentence, is called a
“constituent” of 𝕃𝑛: each constituent 𝐶 has thus the form ±𝑎1 ∧ … ∧ ±𝑎𝑛.
One can check that the set ℂ of the constituents of 𝕃𝑛 contains exactly 𝑞 =
2𝑛 elements, and that only one constituent in ℂ is true. When 𝕃𝑛 is used
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to describe a given domain 𝕌 (“the world”), each constituent provides the
most complete description of a possible state of affairs of 𝕌 (or of a “possible
world”).
The following generalization of the standard notion of constituent will be
useful later. A quasi-constituent (Oddie 1986, p. 86) or conjunctive statement
is a conjunction of 𝑘 literals corresponding to 𝑘 different atomic sentences.
A conjunctive statement, or c-statement for short, has thus the form: ±𝑎𝑖1 ∧
…∧±𝑎𝑖𝑘, where 0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛.
1 If 𝑘 = 0, then the c-statement is tautological; if
𝑘 = 𝑛 then the c-statement is a constituent. One can check that the set of the
quasi-constituents of 𝕃𝑛 contains 3𝑛 members (including the 2𝑛 constituents
of 𝕃𝑛). Whereas constituents are complete descriptions of a possible world, a
quasi-constituent can be construed as a partial or incomplete description of
a possible state of affairs of 𝕌.
When 𝕃𝑛 is used to describe a given domain 𝕌, the true constituent, de-
noted by “𝐶⋆”, can be identified with “the (whole) truth” about𝕌 in 𝕃𝑛, i.e.,
with the most comprehensive true description of the actual state of affairs
expressible within 𝕃𝑛. Note that 𝐶⋆ is the logically strongest true statement,
and entails all true statements in 𝕃𝑛. Conversely, ¬𝐶⋆, the negation of the
true constituent, is the weakest false statement of 𝕃𝑛, since it does not en-
tail any non-tautological true statements in 𝕃𝑛 (cf. Niiniluoto 2003, p. 28).
Whereas 𝐶⋆ represents the complete truth in 𝕃𝑛, “the complete falsity” can
be identified with the strongest false statement in 𝕃𝑛, to be denoted by “𝐶†”.
One can check that 𝐶† is the constituent consisting in the conjunction of the
negations of the literals of 𝐶⋆, whereas ¬𝐶⋆ is the disjunction of such nega-
tions.2
It is well known (e.g., Hintikka 1973) that any consistent (non-contra-
dictory) sentence 𝐴 of 𝕃𝑛 can be expressed as a disjunction of constituents,
i.e., in its so-called normal disjunctive form, as follows:
𝐴 ≡ ෙ
𝐶𝑖∈ℝ𝐴
𝐶𝑖, (1)
where ℝ𝐴 is the the “range” of 𝐴 (Carnap 1950, p. 79), i.e., the set of con-
stituents entailing 𝐴. Intuitively, the constituents in the range of 𝐴 describe
the possible worlds in which 𝐴 is true. Denoting with “⊤” and “⊥” a generic
tautology and a generic contradiction of 𝕃𝑛, respectively, one can check that
ℝ⊤ = ℂ and ℝ⊥ = ∅. Thus, 𝐴 is “factual” or “contingent” if and only if
∅ ≠ ℝ𝐴 ≠ ℂ. Moreover, 𝐴 is true just in case 𝐶⋆ ∈ ℝ𝐴, and false oth-
1 A quasi-constituent has been called “descriptive statement” (or D-statements) by Kuipers (1982) and “con-
junctive theory” (or c-theory) by Cevolani, Crupi, and Festa (2011).
2 Cevolani, Crupi, and Festa (2011) call 𝐶† the “specular” of 𝐶⋆. Cf. Niiniluoto (2003, pp. 28, 30, and 35,
note 4).
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erwise. If 𝐴 (logically) entails 𝐵 – or 𝐵 is a (logical) consequence of 𝐴, in
symbols 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 – then ℝ𝐴 ⊆ ℝ𝐵, and vice versa. Thus, the range of logically
stronger statements is a subset of the range of weaker ones; this is in agree-
ment with the intuition that stronger statements excludes more possibilities
than weaker ones.
2. Semantic information and content
As Floridi (2011b, p. 81) notes, “[i]nformation is notoriously a polymorphic
phenomenon and a polysemantic concept so, as an explicandum, it can be
associated with several explanations” (cf. also Hintikka 1970). Indeed, a
number of explications of the pre-systematic notion of information have been
developed by mathematicians, computer scientists, and philosophers.
A first distinction which is commonly drawn is that between “seman-
tic” and “syntactic” information, the latter being the subject of information
theory – also known as the “(mathematical) theory of communication”, the
“theory (of transmission) of information” (Carnap and Bar-Hillel 1952), or
the “statistical theory of information” (Hintikka 1970). This theory, devel-
oped by Claude Shannon in 1948, studies information in terms of the sta-
tistical rarity of a message, i.e., of the relative stable frequency in which
a message is transmitted through a communication channel. This notion
of information “is purely syntactical, independent of the semantic content
or meaning of a message” (Niiniluoto 1987, p. 151). Starting with Popper
(1934), philosophers have instead been concerned with the notion of seman-
tic information, on which we will focus in the following.
The classical philosophical theory of (semantic) information was created
by Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952), and then further elaborated and system-
atized in particular by Hintikka.3 In Popper’s view, science aims at true and
highly informative theories about its domain of inquiry. Accordingly, sci-
entists should aim at highly falsifiable hypotheses, i.e., hypotheses which
exclude many (empirical) possibilities and than have a great amount of (em-
pirical) content. In other words, the more possibilities a statement (theory,
hypothesis) 𝐴 excludes, the more 𝐴 is informative and hence falsifiable.4 In
3 See Hintikka (1968, 1970, 1984) and Hintikka and Pietarinen (1966). For a compact presentation of this
theory see Niiniluoto (1987, Section 4.5) and Niiniluoto (2011, Section 5). See also Kuipers (2006, Section 2).
4 Popper (1934, pp. 103–104) defined two notions of informative content of𝐴. The first is the “logical content”
of 𝐴, defined as the class of its non-tautological logical consequences: {𝑋 ∶ 𝐴 ⊨ 𝑋 and ⊭ 𝑋}. The second is
the empirical content of 𝐴, defined as the class of its “potential falsifiers”, i.e., of the basic empirical sentences
𝑋 which are logically incompatible with 𝐴. In the fifties, Popper accepted a definition of content essentially
identical to Carnap’s definitions (2) and (3) below (see for instance appendixes 7, 8, and 9 to the English (1959)
edition of his Logik der Forschung).
162
Verisimilitude and strongly semantic information
agreement with this Popperian intuition, Carnap (1942, Section 23, p. 151)
defines the content of 𝐴 as the class of constituents excluded by 𝐴, i.e., as
the range of the negation of 𝐴:
Cont(𝐴) ≝ ℂ ⧵ ℝ𝐴 = ℝ¬𝐴 (2)
One can check that definition (2) fulfills the following condition of adequacy,
proposed by Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952, p. 7) for any adequate definition
of information:
(INF1) Cont(𝐴) ⊇ Cont(𝐵) if and only if 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵
According to definition (2), the contents of most statements turn out to be
incomparable. In order to compare any two statements (within a given lan-
guage) with respect to their informativeness, one need to introduce a quanti-
tative notion of the amount or degree of content of 𝐴. To this purpose, Carnap
and Bar-Hillel (1952, p. 15) propose the following content measure:
cont(𝐴) ≝ 1 − 𝑃(𝐴) = 𝑃(¬𝐴) (3)
where 𝑃(𝐴) is a regular measure of the prior probability of 𝐴.5 Levi (1967,
pp. 69–70) defines the “uniform” content measure cont𝑈 as the number of
possibilities excluded by 𝐴 divided by the total number of possible worlds:
cont𝑈 (𝐴) ≝
|Cont(𝐴)|
|ℂ| = 1 −
|ℝ𝐴|
|ℂ| (4)
The name “uniform” is due to the fact (Niiniluoto 1987, p. 152) that Levi’s
definition is a special case of Carnap and Bar-Hillel’s one, since (3) is reduced
to (4) when 𝑃 assigns the same degree of probability 1|ℂ| =
1
𝑞 to each con-
stituent. Thus, 𝐴 is highly informative when it excludes many possible state
of affairs, i.e., when is highly improbable.6 One can prove that the quantita-
tive definition (3) coheres with the comparative definition (2) of content in
the following sense (Carnap and Bar-Hillel 1952, p. 12):
(INF2) If Cont(𝐴) ⊇ Cont(𝐵) then cont(𝐴) ≥ cont(𝐵).
5 It is worth noting that the theory of semantic information traditionally defines two kinds of information: the
substantive information or information content of a statement and its unexpectedness or surprise value (Hintikka
1968, p. 313; cf. Kuipers 2006, p. 865). For our purposes, it will be sufficient to consider the former concept, i.e.,
cont. As a second explicatum for the amount of information of 𝐴, Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952) proposed the
following definition of the unexpectedness or surprise value inf(𝐴) of 𝐴: inf(𝐴) = − log 𝑃(𝐴), which is formally
identical to the standard definition used in information theory.
6 Definition (3) is a formal explicatum of Popper’s thesis that the information conveyed by 𝐴must be inversely
related to the probability of 𝐴 – a fundamental intuition that philosophers of information call “the Inverse
Relationship Principle (IRP)” (Floridi 2011b, p. 130). Cf. Popper 1934, in particular sections 34 and 35 and
appendix IX (published in 1954 and reprinted in the 1959 English edition), p. 411 and note 8 to this page.
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Some relevant consequences of definitions (2) and (3) are worth noting. First,
in accordance with (INF1) and (INF2), logically stronger statements yield
more information than weaker ones:
If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 then Cont(𝐴) ⊇ Cont(𝐵) and cont(𝐴) ≥ cont(𝐵) (5)
Tautologies are the weakest statements of𝕃𝑛, excluding no possibilities at all;
hence, a tautology ⊤ conveys no (factual) information and has the minimum
degree of content:
Cont(⊤) = ∅ and cont(⊤) = 0 (6)
Conversely, contradictions are incompatible with all possible state of affairs,
hence receive the maximum degree of content:
Cont(⊥) = ℂ and cont(⊥) = 1 (7)
The degree of content of any factual statement is greater than 0 and smaller
than 1. As already Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952, pp. 7–8) pointed out, the
fact that a contradiction is maximally informative may be counterintuitive:
“It might perhaps, at first, seems strange that a self-contradictory sentence,
hence one which no ideal receiver would accept, is regarded as carrying with
it the most inclusive information. It should, however, be emphasized that
semantic information is here not meant as implying truth. A false sentence
which happens to say much is thereby highly informative in our sense. Whe-
ther the information it carries is true or false, scientifically valuable or not,
and so forth, does not concern us. A self-contradictory sentence asserts too
much; it is too informative to be true.” Still, if truth and information are
analyzed as independent concepts, then (7) is a perfectly acceptable conse-
quence of the corresponding definitions (cf. Floridi 2011b, p. 109). However,
some scholars find this separation between truth and information not only at
variance with the ordinary conception of information, but also unacceptable
on the analytical level. Floridi (2004, p. 198), for instance, calls (7) “[w]ith
a little hyperbole […] the Bar-Hillel-Carnap semantic Paradox (BCP)”, and
argues that an appropriate definition of informativeness should avoid it, thus
recovering the intuitive connection between truth and information. Since
this connection plays a central role also in the theory of verisimilitude, we
will first discuss this notion before coming back to Floridi’s proposal in Sec-
tion 4.
3. Truth, content and verisimilitude
Popper (1963, Ch. 10) introduced the concept of verisimilitude or truthlikeness
of scientific theories and hypotheses in order to provide an epistemological
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basis to his falsificationist methodology proposed in Popper (1934).7 Pop-
per claimed that the main cognitive goal of science is truth-approximation
and that scientific progress consists in devising new theories which are closer
to the truth than preceding ones. In an effort to ground this theoretical
framework, Popper proposed a formal definition of verisimilitude, accord-
ing to which a theory is more verisimilar than another if the former entails
more true sentences and less false sentences than the latter. Notwithstand-
ing its intuitive appeal, Popper’s definition was shown to be untenable by
Tichý (1974) and Miller (1974), who independently proved that, according
to this definition, a false theory can never be closer to the truth than an-
other (true or false) theory. The Tichý-Miller theorem opened the way to
the post-Popperian approaches to verisimilitude, emerged since 1975. Such
approaches escape the strictures pointed out by Tichý and Miller, allowing
for a comparison of at least some false theories with regard to their closeness
to the truth.8
In general terms, a statement is highly verisimilar, or “close to the whole
truth”, if it says many things about the target domain and if many of those
things are true. Thus, verisimilitude can be construed as a “mixture of truth
and information” (Oddie 1986, p. 12), or of “truth and content” (Popper
1963, p. 236). In fact, an appropriate measure of the verisimilitude of a the-
ory must depend on both its informativeness or content (how much the the-
ory says) and its accuracy (how much of what the theory says is in fact
true). Intuitively, it is easy to see that neither content nor accuracy alone
is sufficient to define verisimilitude. As an example, let us suppose that
𝐶⋆ ≡ 𝑎1 ∧…∧ 𝑎𝑛 is “the truth” about 𝕌 in 𝕃𝑛. Then, statements 𝑎1 and ¬𝑎2
are equally informative, in that both make a single claim about 𝐶⋆ – but
only the former is true, and hence more verisimilar than the latter. On the
other hand, 𝑎1 and 𝑎1∧𝑎2 are equally accurate, since both are true – but the
latter is more informative, and hence also more verisimilar than the former.
Thus, verisimilitude is a “mixture” of two ingredients, truth and con-
tent. If truth were the only ingredient, then all truths, including tautolo-
gies, would be equally (and maximally) verisimilar; and conversely, if only
content were relevant, then a plain contradiction, being maximally informa-
tive, would be closer to the truth than any other theory (cf. formula (7) in
Section 2). On the contrary, as Oddie (1986, p. x) notes, “the truthlikeness
of a proposition depends not on the quantity of its information… but on the
7 In this paper, we use as synonymous terms like “verisimilitude”, “truthlikeness” and “approximation (or
closeness, or similarity) to the truth”.
8 The main post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude have been developed by Oddie (1986), Niiniluoto (1987),
Kuipers (1987, 2000), and Schurz and Weingartner (1987, 2010). An excellent survey of these theories can be
found in Niiniluoto (1998).
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quality of its information”. In sum, devising highly verisimilar theories is a
“game of excluding falsity and preserving truth” (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 73).
The so called “similarity approach” to verisimilitude (Hilpinen 1976; Nii-
niluoto 1987; Oddie 1986; Tichý 1974) is based on the idea that an appropri-
ate measure of the verisimilitude 𝑉𝑠(𝐴) of a statement 𝐴 should express the
similarity between 𝐴 and “the truth” 𝐶⋆ or, equivalently, the closeness of
𝐴 to 𝐶⋆. More specifically, the basic intuition underlying the similarity ap-
proach is that 𝑉𝑠(𝐴) is defined as an inverse function of the distances between
the disjuncts 𝐶𝑖 of 𝐴 ≡ ⋁𝐶𝑖∈ℝ𝐴 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶⋆. This means that the verisimili-
tude of 𝐴 expresses the closeness of the possible worlds admitted by 𝐴 to the
actual state of affairs.
Niiniluoto (1987, Ch. 6) has shown how to define different kinds of mea-
sures of the distance between𝐴 and𝐶⋆. First, the distanceΔ(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑗) between
two constituents 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑗 is identified with the number of the differences
in the ±-signs between 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑗, divided by 𝑛; i.e., with the number of lit-
erals on which 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑗 disagree, divided by the total number of atomic
sentences.9 Second, the distance Δ(𝐴, 𝐶) between statement 𝐴 and a generic
constituent 𝐶 is defined as a function of the distances Δ(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶) between the
disjuncts 𝐶𝑖 of 𝐴 and 𝐶. For instance, given a constituent 𝐶, the minimum
distance of 𝐴 from 𝐶 is defined as the distance from 𝐶 of the closest con-
stituent entailing 𝐴, as follows:
Δ𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝐶) ≝ min𝐶𝑖∈ℝ𝐴
Δ(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶). (8)
Similarly, the maximum distance of𝐴 from 𝐶 is defined as the distance from
𝐶 of the farthest constituent entailing 𝐴, as follows:
Δ𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐶) ≝ max𝐶𝑖∈ℝ𝐴
Δ(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶). (9)
The “min-max” distance function is defined as a weighted combination of
the two measures just introduced, as follows:
Δ𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐴, 𝐶) ≝ 𝛾Δ𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝐶) + (1 − 𝛾)Δ𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐶) (10)
with 0 < 𝛾 < 1. Note that Δ𝑚𝑖𝑛, Δ𝑚𝑎𝑥, and Δ𝛾𝑚𝑚 are normalized, i.e., vary
between 0 and 1. Thus, three measures of the similarity of 𝐴 to 𝐶 can be
immediately defined as follows:
sim𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝐶) ≝ 1 − Δ𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝐶)
sim𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐶) ≝ 1 − Δ𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐶)
sim𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐴, 𝐶) ≝ 1 − Δ𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐴, 𝐶)
(11)
9 This is the so called Hamming distance between constituents. Note that 0 ≤ Δ(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑗) ≤ 1 andΔ(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶𝑗) = 0
iff 𝑖 = 𝑗.
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Niiniluoto (1987, pp. 218–222) has convincingly argued that neither sim𝑚𝑖𝑛
nor sim𝑚𝑎𝑥 can serve as a basis for an adequate definition of closeness to the
whole truth. Instead, the (degree of) verisimilitude of 𝐴 can be defined as:10
𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐴) ≝ sim𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐴, 𝐶⋆). (12)
Some properties of definition (12) are worth noting. First, 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚 allows that
false statements can be closer to the truth than other false statements, in
agreement with the basic requirement of all post-Popperian accounts of veri-
similitude mentioned above. Moreover, it may well happen that a true state-
ment is too weak or “cautious” to be verisimilar, whereas a very informa-
tive or “bold” statement may be highly verisimilar, although false. In other
words:
(VS1) If 𝐴 is true and 𝐵 is false, it may be that 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐴) < 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐵).
In particular, a tautology is true, but has empty content, i.e., it does not con-
vey any factual information about the world. Accordingly, many false but
informative theories are more verisimilar than tautologies. Since verisimili-
tude is a combination of truth and content, if 𝐴 and 𝐵 are both true, and 𝐴
entails 𝐵, then 𝐴 is also more verisimilar than 𝐵:
(VS2) If 𝐴 and 𝐵 are true, and 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐴) ≥ 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐵).
In other words, among true statements, verisimilitude co-varies with logical
strength. This condition, however, should not hold among false statements,
since logically stronger falsehoods may well lead us farther from the truth: if
𝐴 and 𝐵 are both false, the more verisimilar theory will be the one implying
less – or less serious – falsehoods. Thus:
(VS2) If 𝐴 and 𝐵 are false, and 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, it may be that 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐴) < 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(𝐵).
Thus, among false statements, verisimilitude does not co-vary with logical
strength. It is worth noting that most measures developed within the post-
Popperian theories of verisimilitude satisfy the three properties above. In-
deed, it can be argued that (VS1)–(VS3) should be regarded as adequacy
conditions for any appropriate notion of closeness to the truth.11
10 One should note that Niiniluoto’s favorite definition of the verisimilitude of 𝐴 is not based on sim𝛾𝑚𝑚 but on
the so called min-sum distance function:
Δ𝛾𝛾
ໟ
𝑚𝑠 (𝐴, 𝐶) ≝ 𝛾Δ𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝐶) + 𝛾 ໟΔ𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝐴, 𝐶),
with 0 < 𝛾, 𝛾 ໟ ≤ 1, defined as a weighted sum of the minimum distance and the normalized sum distance
Δ𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝐴, 𝐶). The normalized sum distance of 𝐴 from 𝐶 is the sum of the distances from 𝐶 of all the con-
stituents in the range of 𝐴 normalized with respect to the sum of the distances of all the elements of ℂ from 𝐶:
Δ𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝐴, 𝐶) ≝ ∑𝑖∈ℝ𝐴 Δ(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶)ฃ∑𝐶𝑗∈ℂ Δ(𝐶𝑗 , 𝐶).
11 See Niiniluoto (1987, pp. 232 ff.) for a detailed defense of these and other adequacy conditions. It should be
167
GUSTAVO CEVOLANI
4. Strongly semantic information
According to the classical theory of information summarized in Section 2, a
contradiction is more informative than any other statement, including con-
tingently true statements. Floridi (2004, 2011b) argues that this paradox-
ical consequence (BCP) is inevitable within a theory of “weakly” semantic
information (TWSI) like that of Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952). For this rea-
son, any such theory should be rejected in favor of a theory of “strongly”
semantic information (TSSI): “The general hypothesis is that BCP indicates
that something has gone essentially amiss with TWSI. TWSI is based on
a semantic principle that is too weak, namely that truth-values supervene
on semantic information. A semantically stronger approach, according to
which information encapsulates truth, can avoid the paradox and is more in
line with the ordinary conception of what generally counts as information
(Floridi 2011b, p. 110, italics added).” According to Floridi (2011b, pp. 119
and ff.), the more accurately a statement 𝐴 describes the actual state of af-
fairs 𝐶⋆, the more informative 𝐴 is. Thus, “to develop a clear understanding
of semantic information we need to move from likelihood (TWSI) to likeness
(TSSI)” (Floridi 2011b, p. 129): information is not primarily improbability,
but similarity to the true complete description of the target domain. It fol-
lows, in particular, that a contradiction is not informative at all, since it does
not yield valuable information about 𝐶⋆.
To formally state these intuitions, Floridi defines the degree of discrepancy
(or distance) 𝛿(𝐴, 𝐶⋆) of each statement 𝐴 in 𝕃𝑛 with respect to the actual
state of affairs described by constituent 𝐶⋆.12 For true statements, discrep-
ancy coincides with vacuity, which is defined as the number of possibilities
admitted by 𝐴 divided by their total number (Floridi 2011b, p. 122):
vac(𝐴) ≝ |ℝ𝐴||ℂ| (13)
Thus, the degree of vacuity is inversely related to degree of content; one may
note, in particular, that it is complementary to Levi’s notion of informative-
ness (cf. definition (4) in Section 2):
vac(𝐴) = 1 − cont𝑈 (𝐴) (14)
noted, however, that according to some verisimilitude theorists, notably Oddie (1986), logically stronger true
theories are not necessarily more verisimilar than weaker ones, thus violating (VS2).
12 For the sake of uniformity, and to emphasize the connection between strongly information and verisimilitude,
from now on we depart from Floridi’s notation and terminology, rephrasing his theory in the terminology
introduced in Section 3.
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If 𝐴 is tautological, then its degree of vacuity gets the maximum value:
vac(⊤) = 1 (15)
If 𝐴 is false (but not contradictory), then its degree of discrepancy coincides
with its degree of inaccuracy. As D’Alfonso (2011, Sec. 3.1) points out, this
notion is only defined for statements expressed as conjunctions of literals
of 𝕃𝑛, i.e., for what we called “conjunctive statements” (quasi-constituents).
Given a conjunctive statement𝐴, Floridi (2011b, p. 121) defines the “length”
of 𝐴 as the number 𝑘𝐴 of its conjuncts, and 𝑓𝐴 as the number of its false
conjuncts. The degree of inaccuracy of 𝐴 is then defined as:13
inacc(𝐴, 𝐶⋆) ≝
𝑓𝐴
𝑘𝐴
(16)
In sum, the degree of discrepancy of 𝐴 is defined as follows (Floridi 2011b,
pp. 121–122):
𝛿(𝐴, 𝐶⋆) ≝ ฼
vac(𝐴) if 𝐴 is true and 𝐴 ≢ 𝐶⋆
−inacc(𝐴, 𝐶) if 𝐴 is false and not contradictory (17)
(The reason for the slightly counterintuitive minus sign before inacc(𝐴, 𝐶)
will be clear in amoment.) One should note that, according to definition (13),
the true constituent has degree of vacuity vac(𝐶⋆) = 1|ℂ| . Thus, Floridi
(2011b, p. 120) needs to stipulate that the maximally informative true de-
scription has the lowest degree of discrepancy:
𝛿(𝐶⋆, 𝐶⋆) ≝ 0 (18)
The case of contradictory statements is also taken into account by stipulation
(ibidem):
𝛿(⊥, 𝐶⋆) ≝ −1 (19)
To sum up, all statements receive a degree of discrepancy, or distance from
the actual state of affairs 𝐶⋆, greater than 𝛿(⊥, 𝐶⋆) = −1 and smaller than
𝛿(⊤, 𝐶⋆) = 1, as displayed in Figure 1. Moreover, the null degree of discrep-
ancy 𝛿(𝐶⋆, 𝐶⋆) represents a threshold in the sense that all false statements
receive a negative degree of discrepancy and all true statements (excluding
𝐶⋆ itself) a positive degree of discrepancy.
13 One can check that, if 𝐴 is a statement of generic form, there is no simple way to satisfactorily define “the
number of erroneous atomic messages” of 𝐴, nor its “length”, nor obviously their ratio, i.e., inacc(𝐴, 𝐶). For
more on this point, see Cevolani (2012).
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.
−1 0 1
𝛿(𝐴, 𝐶⋆)
⊥ 𝐶⋆ ⊤⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
contingently false 𝐴
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
contingently true 𝐴 ≢ 𝐶⋆
Figure 1: Degrees of discrepancy (distance from the truth 𝐶⋆) in Floridi’s
theory.
Finally, the degree of strongly semantic information (or strongly semantic
content) of 𝐴 is defined as (Floridi 2011b, p. 123):
cont𝑆(𝐴, 𝐶) ≝ 1 − 𝛿(𝐴, 𝐶⋆)2 (20)
Some features of Floridi’s definition of informativeness (20) are worth not-
ing. First, one can then check that the cont𝑆 measure is normalized, i.e., 0 ≤
cont𝑆(𝐴, 𝐶) ≤ 1 for any statement 𝐴. Second, both tautologies and contra-
dictions have the minimum degree of informativeness (i.e., 0). Third, cont𝑆
fulfills Carnap and Bar-Hillel’s adequacy conditions (INF1) and (INF2) only
with respect to true statements: among true statements, information co-
varies with logical strength:
If 𝐴 and 𝐵 are true and 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 then
cont𝑆(𝐴, 𝐶) ≥ cont𝑆(𝐵, 𝐶)
(21)
Among false statements, this condition does not hold: logically stronger false
statements may be less informative than weaker ones.
5. Strongly semantic information, (partial) truth, and verisimilitude
Floridi’s notion of strongly semantic information (Section 4) appears to be
very close to Popper’s notion of verisimilitude (Section 3), as the following
quotation clearly reveals (Floridi 2011b, pp. 118–119):14 “two [statements]
can both be false and yet significantly more or less distant from the event or
state of affairs [𝐶⋆] about which they purport to be informative, e.g. ‘there
are ten people in the library’ and ‘there are fifty people in the library’, when
in fact there are nine people in the library. Likewise, two [statements] can
both be true and yet deviate more or less significantly from [𝐶⋆], e.g. ‘there
is someone in the library’ vs. ‘there are 9 or 10 people in the library’. This
14 Here, although Floridi cites Popper (1934), he’s probably referring to Popper (1963).
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implies that a falsehood with a very low degree of discrepancy may be prag-
matically preferable to a truth with a very high degree of discrepancy (Pop-
per 1934).” Since Floridi explicitly defines informativeness as the degree of
similarity or closeness to the true description of the actual state of affairs,
strongly semantic information and verisimilitude become virtually indistin-
guishable notions (cf. also D’Alfonso 2011, p. 66). Thus, the problem arises
of what the conceptual and formal relationships between these two notions
are.
In answering this question, it is useful to focus first on the relationship
between information and truth. Indeed, Floridi’s starting point in putting
forward his theory of strongly semantic information is the so-called “veridi-
cality thesis” (VT), which raised much debate among philosophers of infor-
mation (see Floridi 2011b, Ch. 4 and Floridi 2011a for a survey of different
positions). According to VT, statement 𝐴 has to be “truthful” or “veridi-
cal” about the target domain in order to qualify as a piece information at all.
As noted in Section 2, Carnap and Bar-Hillel defended the opposite claim,
according to which information and truth can be construed as independent
notions. Without entering into this debate, we wish to note that the thesis
that “information encapsulates truth” can be formally phrased in quite dif-
ferent ways. Three of them deserving particular attention are the following:
VT1 𝐴 is informative if and only if 𝐴 is factually true.
VT2 𝐴 is informative if and only if 𝐴 is truthlike.
VT3 𝐴 is informative if and only if 𝐴 is partially true.
(The notion of partial truth will be defined in due time.) In informal pre-
sentations, VT is usually equated with VT1. For instance, Floridi (2011b,
e.g. p. 105) tends to treat “veridical” and “true” as synonymous terms (or
as merely stylistic variants); this implies that the expression “‘true infor-
mation’ is simply redundant and ‘false information’, i.e., misinformation, is
merely pseudo-information” (ibidem, p. 82). Note that VT1 implies that:
If 𝐴 is false, then 𝐴 is uninformative (22)
In fact, if𝐴 has to be true in order to be informative, then all false statements
would be not informative at all. A simple informationmeasure coherent with
VT1 is the following “truth-content” measure:
cont𝑇 (𝐴) ≝ ฼
cont𝑈 (𝐴) if 𝐴 is true
0 otherwise (23)
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Some relevant properties of this measure are the following:
cont𝑇 (⊤) = 0
cont𝑇 (⊥) = 0
If 𝐴 is false then cont𝑇 (𝐴) = 0
If 𝐴 and 𝐵 are true and 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 then cont𝑇 (𝐴) ≥ cont𝑇 (𝐵)
(24)
Thus, cont𝑇 trivially satisfies (22), and hence avoids BCP. Moreover, it agrees
with Floridi’s cont𝑆 as far as true statements are concerned, as one can easily
check noting that, if 𝐴 is true, cont𝑆(𝐴) = 1 − vac(𝐴)2 and cont𝑇 (𝐴) =
1 − vac(𝐴).
However, it is doubtful that supporters of VTwould regard VT1 as an ad-
equate explication of the veridicality thesis, not least because (22) appears at
least as counter-intuitive as BCP. For instance, Floridi’s own measure cont𝑆
assigns a positive degree of strongly semantic information tomost false state-
ments. According to cont𝑆 , false statements are the more informative the
more accurate they are about the target domain: a false statement yielding
more truths than falsehoods will be quite informative. This suggests that
VT could be interpreted as VT2, i.e., as saying that 𝐴 has to be verisimilar
in order to be informative. To our knowledge, VT2 was first proposed and
defended by Frické (1997), in a paper which, although passed virtually un-
noticed among philosophers of information, seems to anticipate some central
intuitions underlying the debate about the veridicality thesis: “With true
statements, verisimilitude increases with specificity and comprehensiveness,
so that a highly specific and comprehensive statement will have high veri-
similitude; such statements also seem to be very informative. With false
statements, verisimilitude is intended to capture what truth they contain;
if false statements can convey information, and the view taken here is that
they can, it might be about those aspects of reality to which they approxi-
mate. Verisimilitude and a concept of information appear to be co-extensive
(Frické 1997, p. 882). ” Frické (1997, pp. 855, Sec. 4, p. 891) discusses and
rejects both VT1 and the classical thesis that truth and information are in-
dependent concepts, and proposes to use the similarity measures developed
by verisimilitude theorists for defining quantitative notions of semantic in-
formation. Following this strategy, in agreement with VT2, a notion of infor-
mativeness may be defined with the help of Niiniluoto’s verisimilitude min-
max measure:
cont𝛾𝑉𝑆(𝐴) ≝ 𝑉𝑠
𝛾
𝑚𝑚(𝐴) (25)
Some relevant properties of this measure are the following (cf. Niiniluoto
1987, p. 223):
cont𝛾𝑉𝑆(⊤) = 𝛾 > 0
If 𝐴 and 𝐵 are true and 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 then cont𝛾𝑉𝑆(𝐴) ≥ cont𝑉𝑆(𝐵)
(26)
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Note that, since cont𝛾𝑉𝑆 is undefined for contradictions, one could stipulate
that their degree of information is 0, in agreement with Floridi’s (19), thus
avoiding BCP.
It seems that VT2 captures some, but not all, of the intuitions under-
lying Floridi’s conception of strongly semantic information. The close link
between verisimilitude and strongly semantic information has been pointed
out for instance by Bremer and Cohnitz (2004, p. 90), but has been first dis-
cussed in full details in a recent paper by D’Alfonso (2011). D’Alfonso seems
to endorse VT2, and applies Niiniluoto’s and Oddie’s measures of similarity,
as well as a new measure of his own, to quantify strongly semantic infor-
mation. However, one may note that verisimilitude and strongly semantic
information differ under important respects. In particular, cont𝛾𝑉𝑆 assigns
to tautologies a positive degree of informativeness, in contrast with both the
classical theory of semantic information and Floridi’s theory. This is natural
in the case of verisimilitude since tautologies, when conceived as answers to a
cognitive problem, correspond to suspending the judgement, which is better
than accepting strong falsehoods.
A part from this problem, which may be solved by stipulation (as sug-
gested by cf. D’Alfonso 2011, p. 73), the relevant point is that Floridi’s fa-
vored measure cont𝑆 can not serve as a measure of the verisimilitude of false
statements. This becomes evident considering the case of completely false c-
statements. A c-statement 𝐴 is completely false when it is a conjunction of
false literals (Cevolani, Crupi, and Festa 2011, Sec. 2). In this case, it is easy
to check that inacc(𝐴, 𝐶) = 1 and hence cont𝑆(𝐴) = 0 (cf. definitions 16
and 20). This means that, were cont𝑆 to be used as a measure of verisimili-
tude, it would assigns to all completely false c-statements the lowest degree
or verisimilitude, on a par with contradictions. For instance, assuming that
𝐶⋆ ≡ 𝑎1 ∧ 𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎3 is the truth in 𝕃3 (cf. Table 1), statements ¬𝑎1, ¬𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2,
and ¬𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2 ∧ ¬𝑎3 would be all equally verisimilar according to cont𝑆 , al-
though intuitively their verisimilitude is quite different. On the contrary,
one can check that 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚 correctly discriminate these three cases, yielding
𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(¬𝑎1) > 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(¬𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2) > 𝑉𝑠𝛾𝑚𝑚(¬𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2 ∧ ¬𝑎3). In sum, whereas
verisimilitude is a combination of truth and content, strongly semantic in-
formation (as defined by Floridi) corresponds to informative content for true
statements and to mere accuracy for false (c-)statements. This implies that,
somehow paradoxically, cont𝑆 is insensitive to content, as far as complete
falsehoods are concerned.
A third version of VT somehow related to VT2, and apparently also close
to Floridi’s intuitions, is VT3, according to which 𝐴 has to be partially true
in order to be informative. The intuition is that 𝐴 has to convey at least
some (non-tautological) true information about the target domain in order to
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count as a piece of information at all. According to Hilpinen (1976), the de-
gree of partial truth of 𝐴measures the amount of information about the truth
conveyed by a (true or false) statement 𝐴 (see also Niiniluoto 1987, Sec. 5.4
and 6.1). An adequate definition of the degree of partial truth is arguably
the following (Niiniluoto 1987, pp. 218–220):
cont𝑃𝑇 (𝐴) ≝ 1 − Δ𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐶⋆) (27)
where Δ𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the max-distance measure introduced in Section 3. One can
check that:
cont𝑃𝑇 (⊤) = 0
If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵 then cont𝑃𝑇 (𝐴) ≥ cont𝑃𝑇 (𝐵)
(28)
Again, one can stipulate that cont𝑃𝑇 (⊥) = 0, thus avoiding BCP (an argu-
ment to this effect was already proposed by Hilpinen 1976, p. 30). When
VT3 is based on cont𝑃𝑇 , the degree of partial truth of true statements de-
pend on their content, whereas for false statements it depends on how much
information about the truth they convey (Niiniluoto 1987, p. 176). In partic-
ular, both cont𝑃𝑇 (𝐴) and cont𝑆(𝐴) imply that “bad falsities” are completely
uninformative:15
cont𝑃𝑇 (¬𝐶⋆) = 0
cont𝑃𝑇 (𝐶†) = cont𝑆(𝐶†) = 0
If 𝐴 is a completely false c-statement then
cont𝑃𝑇 (𝐴) = cont𝑆(𝐴) = 0
(29)
This is coherent with VT3, since it may be argued that completely false (con-
junctive) statements are not “veridical” at all, in the sense that they convey
no true factual information about theworld (cf.Hilpinen 1976 andNiiniluoto
1987, p. 201). The relations between Floridi’s measure cont𝑆 and measures
cont𝑇 , cont
𝛾
𝑉𝑆 , cont𝑃𝑇 can be better appreciated when these fourmeasures are
compared with respect to the 27 c-statements of 𝕃3, as illustrated in Table 1.
6. Concluding remarks
In the preceding section, we tried to disentangle the conceptual relations be-
tween the notions of semantic information, truth, verisimilitude, and partial
truth. To this purpose, we formally compared Floridi’s concept of strongly
semantic information, on the one hand, and three different notions of infor-
mation, on the other. These latter notions were inspired by three different
15 Note that cont𝑆 (¬𝐶⋆) is undefined, since ¬𝐶⋆ is not a c-statement.
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𝐴 cont𝑆(𝐴) cont𝑇 (𝐴) cont
1
2
𝑉𝑆(𝐴) cont𝑃𝑇 (𝐴)
𝐶⋆ = 1. 𝑎1 ∧ 𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎3 1 1 1 1
2. 𝑎1 ∧ 𝑎2 0.94 0.75 0.83 0.6
3. 𝑎1 ∧ 𝑎2 ∧ ¬𝑎3 0.88 0 0.66 0.6
4. 𝑎1 ∧ 𝑎3 0.94 0.75 0.83 0.6
5. 𝑎1 0.75 0.5 0.66 0.3
6. 𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎3 0.75 0 0.5 0.3
7. 𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎3 0.88 0 0.66 0.3
8. 𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2 0.75 0 0.5 0.3
9. 𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2 ∧ ¬𝑎3 0.55 0 0.33 0.3
10. 𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎3 0.94 0.75 0.83 0.6
11. 𝑎2 0.75 0.5 0.66 0.3
12. 𝑎2 ∧ ¬𝑎3 0.75 0 0.5 0.3
13. 𝑎3 0.75 0.5 0.66 0.3
14. ⊤ 0 0 0.5 0
15. ¬𝑎3 0 0 0.66 0
16. ¬𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎3 0.75 0 0.5 0.3
17. ¬𝑎2 0 0 0.33 0
18. ¬𝑎2 ∧ ¬𝑎3 0 0 0.16 0
19. ¬𝑎1 ∧ 𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎3 0.88 0 0.66 0.6
20. ¬𝑎1 ∧ 𝑎2 0.75 0 0.5 0.3
21. ¬𝑎1 ∧ 𝑎2 ∧ ¬𝑎3 0.88 0 0.33 0.3
22. ¬𝑎1 ∧ 𝑎3 0.75 0 0.5 0.3
23. ¬𝑎1 0 0 0.33 0
24. ¬𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎3 0 0 0.16 0
25. ¬𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎3 0.55 0 0.33 0.3
26. ¬𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2 0 0 0.16 0
27. ¬𝑎1 ∧ ¬𝑎2 ∧ ¬𝑎3 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Comparison of Floridi’s measure of strongly semantic information
cont𝑆 and themeasures of information as truth-content (cont𝑇 ), as verisimil-
itude (cont𝛾𝑉𝑆 , with 𝛾 =
1
2), and as partial truth (cont𝑃𝑇 ).
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interpretations of the so-called “veridicality thesis” VT, according to which
“information encapsulates truth”.
According to the first (VT1), a statement is informative only if it is true.
Although Floridi (2004, 2011b) seems occasionally ready to accept VT1, the
consequence that false statements are plainly uninformative is violated by
his own information measure cont𝑆 .16 Thus, it seems safe to conclude that
VT1 should be excluded as an interpretation of VT.
According to a different thesis (VT2), proposed by Frické (1997) and en-
dorsed by D’Alfonso (2011), (strongly) semantic information may be identi-
fied with verisimilitude or truthlikeness. Notwithstanding its possible mer-
its, VT2 is not supported by Floridi’s own theory. In particular, Floridi’s
measure can not be used as a verisimilitude measure since it can not discrim-
inate among false statements with very different degrees of closeness to the
truth. On the other hand, verisimilitude measures violates the requirement
that tautologies yield no information, a condition virtually accepted by all
philosophers of information.17
Finally, a third reading of VT was proposed (VT3), according to which an
informative statement is a partially true one. The notion of partial truth has
been rigorously defined by Hilpinen (1976) and Niiniluoto (1987), and has
many aspects in common with Floridi’s notion of strongly semantic informa-
tion. In particular, it fulfills the requirement according to which complete
falsities are also completely uninformative. According to VT3, the degree of
strongly semantic information of𝐴 is construed as the information about the
truth yielded by 𝐴 – an idea which appears to be the most convincing of the
three. Indeed, we suggest that the notion of partial truth captures all the
essential intuitions underlying Floridi’s theory, and that cont𝑃𝑇 should be
favored over Floridi’s cont𝑆 as a measure of strongly semantic information.
This suggestion is further developed in Cevolani (2012).
Another conclusion to be drawn from our comparison is that the post-
Popperian theories of verisimilitude offer to philosophers of information a
full arsenal of both conceptual and formal tools. Frické (1997) andD’Alfonso
(2011) argue hat these tools can be fruitfully employed in developing philo-
sophical theories of information, and our paper supports this claim. More
particularly, the notions of verisimilitude and partial truth can illuminate
the debate about the veridicality thesis. In this connection, our analysis does
not support any definite conclusion about the soundness of this thesis, and
does not allow, per se, to choose between VT and the opposite thesis of the
“alethic neutraliy” of information (Floridi 2011a). However, in the author’s
16 Obviously, one could try to defend VT1 by saying that a literal (but not more complex statements) is infor-
mative if and only if it is true. However, this would devoid VT1 of most of its interest.
17 We are here excluding from consideration the notion of “depth information” developed by Hintikka.
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opinion, it does suggest, as a methodological recommendation, that truth
and information are better analysed as independent concepts, and that other
notions, like for instance strongly semantic information and verisimilitude,
can then be defined on their basis.
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